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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JEANNETTE U, SWAN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14823

DR. ROBERT H. LAMB and
DR. DENNIS D. THOEN,
Defendants and
Respondents.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Respondents respectfully petition this Court for a rehearing of the above-entitled matter pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
This was an appeal from the Salt Lake District Court based
upon the failure of the trial court to allow the testimony of
an out-of-state expert who failed to qualify as being familiar
with Salt Lake community medical standards.
On August 16, 1978 this court reversed the trial court's
decision and ordered a new trial.

This Court held that a new

"similar community" standard of care should be adopted in Utah
and overruled the previous "strict locality" standard.

-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Respondents respectfully request that a rehearing be held
solely as to the issue of whether this Court's decision should
be applied retroactively or prospectively.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only pertinent facts relevant to this rehearing are
as follows:

First, the alleged malpractice occurred in 1973.

Second, the trial in this matter occurred in September of 1976,
Finally, at both the time of the alleged malpractice and at the
time of trial the "strict locality" standard, formulated by
this Court in numerous decisions beginning from the time of
statehood, was in effect.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST TO APPLY THE NEW
"SIMILAR LOCALITY" STANDARD TO THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE AND TO ANY OTHER PARTIES RETROACTIVELY BECAUSE THIS COURT'S
DECISION CHANGES A STANDARD OF CARE UPON
WHICH THESE DEFENDANTS, DEFENDANTS IN OTHER
PENDING LAWSUITS, AND DOCTORS NOT YET SUED
HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO RELY UPON.
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent
may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward
operation and that of relation backward.

It may say that deci-

sions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law
nonetheless for intermediate transactions.

The choice for any

. dsta te may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the JU
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and
nature.

Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil and

Refining Company, 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
It is generally accepted that an appellate court, upon
overruling a previous decision, has three choices as to how
the overruling decision should be applied:

First, the over-

ruling decision can be given a purely prospective application
where the new law declared will not even apply to the parties
to the overruling case; second, the decision can be given a
limited retroactive effect where the law declared will govern
the rights of the parties to the overruling case but in all
other cases will be applied prospectively; and finally, the
decision can be given general retroactive effect where the
law declared will govern the rights of the parties to the overruling case but in all other cases will be applied prospectively.

See generally, Ann., "Prospective or Retroactive Opera-

tion of Overruling Decisions", 10 A.L.R.3d 1371-1447.
In deciding the effect an overruling decision should be
given it is recognized that three separate factors should be
considered:
[T]he decision "must establish a new principle of law, even by overruling clear past precedent in which litigants may have relied, or
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by deciding an issue of first impression
whose resolution was not clearly f oreshadowed". Second, we must evaluate the merit
of retroactive or prospective application
of the rule in light of prior history, purpose and effect. Third, we must weight the
hardship and injustice of applying the rule
to the litigants in the instant case. Moore
v. State, 553 P.2d 828
(Alaska 1976). (Emphasis added).
See also State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 493 P.2d 1002 (Utah 1972); State v. stenrud,
553 P.2d 1201 (Ariz. 1976); In Re Bye, 524 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1974);
Russell v. Blackwell, 492 P.2d 953

(Haw. 1972); and Wood v.

Morris, 554 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1976).
In applying these standards to the case at bar, it can
readily be seen that substantial justice will be served only
by the prospective application of this Court's decision.
First, there can be no doubt that this Court's decision
established a new principle of law in that it overruled the
medical malpractice standard which has been utilized in the
State of Utah since its statehood.

It is elementary that proof

of a standard of skill required of a physician is essential for
a plaintiff to prevail in a malpractice action.

The standard

establishes the duty owed by the physician to the patient and
thus is an essential element of a plaintiff's case.
Second, the prior history, purpose, and effect of the
strict locality rule was to provide a workable standard for the
medical community by requiring each practitioner to be as competent as other practitioners in the same community.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This rule

protected a physician from meeting a higher standard found in
other communities which may have resulted from better medical
facilities and opportunities for training.

It protected the

physician from being subjected to a standard which he could
not meet under the circumstances existing at that time.

Like-

wise, the patient only had to prove that the physician breached
a standard held within the same community regardless of whether
it was higher or lower than surrounding communities.
Third, it is obvious that retroactive application of this
Court's decision in the instant case will cause great hardship
and injustice not only to defendants in this instant case put
to all physicians who have practiced up until the date of this
Court's decision.
The standard to be applied in a malpractice case should be
at the time the malpractice occurred--not in retrospect at the
time of trial.

In Brown v. Colm, 522 P.2d 688 (Cal. 1974) a

suit was commenced in 1968 alleging malpractice in 1949.

The

court in that case held it was error to exclude the testimony
of an expert witness who was not personally acquainted with the
medical standard in the year 1949 but who had studied the standard which existed at that time in a similar community.

The

court, in reversing the lower court decision, stated that it was
essential for the plaintiff to, prove the standard existing ~
the time of the alleged malpractice in order to determine what
degree of skill, knowledge and care was required by the physician
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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at the time of the occurrence.
Section 78-14-4, U.C.A. provides as follows:
No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after
the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence, except that:
(In
an action where a foreign object has been
left in the body the claim must be commenced within one year after the patient discovers or should have discovered it) and
(if a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct by fraud it must be
brought within one year after the patient
discovers or should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment) •
Thus, under the Statute of Limitations physicians can be
liable for a period of two-to-four years after the occurrence
giving rise to the alleged malpractice and in certain instances
can be liable for many years beyond that period if the patient
fails to discover a foreign object or a fraudulent concealment.
A retroactive application of this Court's decision substantially affects three classifications of physicians:

first,

it affects the defendants in the instant case who performed the
surgery in 1973; second, it affects those physicians who were
sued prior to this Court's decision in the instant case but who
had not yet had a final judgment; and finally, it affects those
physicians who may be sued in the future for alleged malpractice events which occurred prior to this Court's decision.

-6-
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In each instance, the physicians in question relied upon
the local community standard as the duty owed to their patients
at the time the alleged malpractices occurred.

As pointed out

extensively in respondents' brief in chief there are numerous
differences in opinions concerning a variety of medical operations and procedures and a physician is under a much greater
liability if he is subjected to a "similar community standard"
in which the practice or procedure is not accepted in the community in which he practices.

It cannot be assumed, for exam-

ple, that one procedure used to remove a kidney is of lesser
quality than a different procedure used by doctors in another
community.

However, a physician knowing that he may have to

justify his procedure as compared with the other will have to
more carefully evaluate which procedure is most generally accepted in "similar communities" if he is to avoid groundless
lawsuits.
If a physician is to be judged by a similar community standard then it is only equitable that he knows this at the time
he is performing the medical care so that he has the choice of
deciding whether to undertake a given procedure or whether such
procedure may be too controversial or unproven in light of differing community standards.
Respondents submit, therefore, that this Court's decision
should be given a strict prospective application including the
Plaintiff in the instant case since defendants at the time of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the operation relied upon the local community standard which
had existed in this state for over 100 years.
And while it is commendable for a plaintiff to seek change
in an existing rule of law this benefit must not be outweighed
by the reliance and injustice which will occur to the defendant.
As stated by one authority concerning this problem of retroactive application of a decision and its effect upon the plaintiff and defendant:
[I]nsofar as the need for incentive to have
outmoded or unjust rules overturned is concerned, it may be urged that if a party who
seeks to have an old rule overturned has reason to believe that he can show that reliance
interests are not justifiable or sufficiently
strong, he has adequate incentive to request
the overruling of the earlier case in such a
manner that the overruling decision can be
applied retroactively not only to the parties
similarly situated, for example, to others who
have commenced or are about to commence litigation~ but it would appear only fair that
the party seeking to have an old rule overturned must take the risk that if the opposing party had strong and justifiable reliance
interests which are entitled to protection, the
overruling decision will be given prospective
effect only, so as not to apply in the overruling case itself.
(Emphasis added). Annot.,
10 A.L.R.3d 1971, 1380.
In cases such as this where a long established standard
has been abruptly overturned there must necessarily be severe
hardship and injustice which require prospective application of
the decision.

Cascade Security Bank v. Butler, 567 P.2d G3l

(Wash. 1977).

-a-
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POINT II
THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THIS COURT'S
DECISION OVERRULING THE "STRICT LOCALITY
RULE" IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.
This Court in numerous decisions has consistently held
that rights, duties, and privileges should generally be changed
only by the legislature or in rare instances by this Court but
that in every case fair notice must be given to those who relied
upon the previous law.
In Rubalcava v. Gissman, 384 P.2d 389 (1963) this Court
held that a wife could not maintain a tort action against-her
husband or his estate.

Justice Crockett in stating why the rule

should not be modified stated the following:
It has always been the law of our state,
insofar as we have been able to ascertain,
that a suit of this character could not be
maintained.
It is inevitable that this has
been assumed to be the law and has been depended upon in the formation of existing
contracts. We are of the opinion that under
these circumstances, in fairness to those
who have relied thereon, and in proper deference to the solidarity of the law, any
change could be justified only to correct
patent error, (Footnote citing Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil Company
as allowing prospective effect of decisions)
otherwise it should be made by the legislature, plainly so declaring, so that all
may be advised what the change is and when
it will be effective. Id. at 393.
In Williams v. Utah State Department of Finance, 464 P.2d
59 6 (Utah 1970) this court held that a prior decision overruling
~stablished law concerning the right to attorney's fees would

l
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not be applied retroactively and that the Court would not indulge in the fiction that the previous controlling law never
existed.
F.2d 434

~also

Draper v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 429

(10th Cir. 1970)

(Applying Utah law prospectively).

In State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 493 P.2d 1002 (Utah 1972) this Court declined to apply an overruled decision prospectively on the basis that there was no showing "that any considerable number of
persons or corporations will be affected by letting the decision apply retroactively."

The Court also stated "There is no

showing that injustice would result or that administration of
justice would in any way be affected."

Id. at 1003.

In this

case, however, there is obviously a large number of persons
affected by the change in standard which will result in great
injustice and will severely restrict the administration of
justice.
In Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976)
this Court declined to apply retroactively Section 78-27-39,
u.c.A. which allowed for the contribution of joint tort feasors.
This Court stated:

"The contribution statute established a

primary right and duty which was not in existence at the time
the injuries in this case arose."

Id. at 542.

The "duty" in

a medical malpractice case is dependent upon the standard utilized by the plaintiff and such duties will necessarily arise
.
h
t tes where no
from comparisons of medical standar d in ot er s a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~

such duties existed under local standards.
In Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P.2d 303

(1977), as supplemented,

567 P.2d 625 (1977) Justice Crockett stated the reasoning of
this Court as to why the lower court's decision raising the minority age of females from 18 to 21 was erroneous as to a divorce decree which had been entered many years before.

Justice

Crockett stated the following:
I reiterate with the firmest possible conviction that in my judgment it would be wholly discordant to principles of equity and
justice to impose such an unexpected and unplanned for burden upon the defendant by an
ex post facto change of the rules after the
entry of the decree. Id. at 305.
Finally, in this Court's recent decision of State v. Kelbach, 565 P.2d 700 (1977) this Court stated in great detail
the purpose of applying overruled decisions prospectively:
Justice Crockett wrote:
As a general proposition the law as established should remain so until change by the
legislature, whose prerogative it is to make
and change the law. This does not mean to
say that where there is judge-made law which
is later observed to be clearly in error,
that such error should be so set in cement
that it cannot be remedied.
In such circumstances the court undoubtedly can and should
correct it.
That more important than any of the above is
the oft proclaimed salutary principle: that
ours is a government of laws and not of men.
Accordingly, the law should not be changed
simply because of the will or desire of judges as to what the law is or ought to be.
Much less so, should it be so changed during
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the course of a particular proceeding to
have a retroactive effect thereon. Notwithstanding the fact that the change the state
advocates would vindicate the position taken
in the dissent referred to, to so hold in
this case retroactively would violate what
we regard as a higher principle:
that of
honoring the established law.
If there is
to be such a change in the law, whether by
legislative act or by judicial decision, it
seems that it should have only prospective
effect and that fairness and good conscience
requires that it should not be applied retroactively to adversely affect rights as they
existed at the time the particular controversy arose.
(Citation to Great Northern
Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil Company).
Id.
at 702.
This long line of cases clearly shows this Court's concern
that the law be a reliable monument upon which a party can rely··
not a shifting mound of sand.

If the law is to be changed it

should only be done after notice of such change has been given
to all concerned and not, as Justice Crockett stated in the~ton opinion, after the ballgame has already begun.
CONCLUSION
The decision in the instant case is an extremely important
one not only to the present litigants but to hundreds of litigants in the future years.

It establishes what standard will be

used to judge physicians in this state and presumably can logi·
cally be extended to all professionals.
The change to the "similar locality rule" is a drastic one
in that it overrules a standard which has existed for over lOO
years.

It is unjust to apply this new standard with all of

-12-
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its consequences and ramifications to these defendants and to
other physicians who in good faith attempted to meet the local
conununity standard existing at the time the alleged malpractic es occurred.
such unfairness affects the defendants in the instant case,
all the physicians presently in litigation, and all future physicians or professionals whose actions occurred prior to this
Court's decision.
For these reasons, respondents respectfully request that
a rehearing be granted as to the issue of prospective application of this Court's decision in order that this important and
far-reaching aspect of the case may be fully argued by the parties.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN

spondent Dr. Thoen
702 Kearns Bui ding
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN &
EVANS

/.
RAY CHRISTENSEN
Attorney for Respondent Dr. Lamb
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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